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REDRAWING THE DIVIDING LINES BETWEEN NATURAL LAW 
AND POSITIVISM(S) 
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski* 
HE citadel of Hartian jurisprudence, while well-defended, is draw-
ing increasing fire. Most besiegers, moreover, do not ride under the 
banner of Hart’s most famous rival, Ronald Dworkin.1 Rather, a motley 
coalition of consequentialists, natural lawyers, and others defying stand-
ard labels seek to fling open the doors, windows, and drawbridges of an-
alytic jurisprudence to let in the fresh air and light of political and moral 
theory, history, metaphysics, and even theology.2 Others seek to remodel 
from within, reconstructing Hart’s edifice on naturalist foundations, ra-
ther than conceptual analysis.3 
It is not surprising that many papers at a conference on jurisprudence 
and history run in this vein. Anglo-American jurisprudence, before it in-
sulated itself in conceptual analysis and defined itself in opposition to 
broader questions, was properly a “sociable science,” to use Professor 
Postema’s phrase from his symposium article.4 And, in part due to the 
exemplars of history, so it may become again. By drawing on Bentham 
and Hobbes, Professor Dan Priel’s Toward Classical Positivism points 
 
* Associate Professor of Law and Robert & Marion Short Scholar, Notre Dame Law 
School. 
1 See Scott J. Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, in Ronald 
Dworkin 22–55 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007) (surveying the famed disagreements between 
these protagonists). 
2 See, e.g., Tom D. Campbell, The Legal Theory of Ethical Positivism 3 (1996) (emphasiz-
ing the systemic moral benefits of a system in which “identification and application of law 
[is] kept as separate as possible from the moral judgments which go into making law”); Ma-
ris Köpcke Tinturé, Concept and Purpose in Legal Theory: How to “Reclaim” Fuller, 58 
Am. J. Juris. 75, 95–96 (2013) (drawing on the work of John Finnis to explain why a natural 
lawyer values law’s positivity); Frederick Schauer, Was Austin Right After All? On the Role 
of Sanctions in a Theory of Law, 23 Ratio Juris 1, 9 (2010) (criticizing Hartian positivism’s 
narrow focus on “essential” conceptual features while ignoring sanctions and coercion); see 
also Sean Coyle, Dimensions of Politics and English Jurisprudence 9 (2013) (“Jurists and 
political philosophers ought not to be so impressed with the understandings implied by ana-
lytical jurisprudence . . . . [For] the question of the city and of the soul is central to the prob-
lems of political philosophy.”).  
3 See Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Three Approaches, in The Future of Natu-
ralism 197–208 (John R. Shook & Paul Kurtz eds., 2009); accord Kevin Toh, Hart’s Expres-
sivism and His Benthamite Project, 11 Legal Theory 75, 77–80 (2005). 
4 Gerald J. Postema, Jurisprudence, The Sociable Science, 101 Va. L. Rev. 869, 869 
(2015). 
T
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forward toward more fruitful methods of jurisprudence while illuminat-
ing the recent history and current state of inquiry.5 His article demon-
strates the virtues and promise of a more catholic approach to jurispru-
dence. It also raises challenging questions about the direction to take this 
rediscovered path, and I am not sure I always agree with his suggested 
answers. Any misgivings I have about Priel’s particular approach, how-
ever, do not diminish my appreciation; I find even the points of disa-
greement to be live and meaningful, and that itself is refreshing. 
As the introductory remarks suggest, I welcome Priel’s call to broad-
en jurisprudential inquiry. It seems that the major dispute in jurispru-
dence as understood today—disagreement between positivists and natu-
ral lawyers6—can be cogently encapsulated in a pithy essay like Brian 
Bix’s On The Dividing Line Between Natural Law Theory and Legal 
Positivism.7 As insightful and persuasive as I find that essay, one is left 
thinking that there has got to be more to general jurisprudence, especial-
ly when the central, conventional debate goes not to the relevance of 
moral considerations, but to whether those concerns pertain to legal phi-
losophy. The standard response to this complaint is that the questioner 
wants to pursue political or moral philosophy, not general jurisprudence. 
Priel does not think he has shown up at the wrong building on cam-
pus. He argues for a new dividing line between natural law and positiv-
ism, one that does not turn on whether moral criteria are components of 
the rule of recognition in all possible legal systems. Classical positivists 
like Bentham and Hobbes agreed with natural lawyers that jurisprudence 
is inextricably interwoven with theorizing about metaphysics, human na-
ture, morals, and politics, in that order. Classical positivism would not 
find it strange that even John Finnis, the natural lawyer most likely to 
speak the language of contemporary jurisprudence, still places moral 
philosophy, political theory, and human nature at the core of his juris-
prudential magnum opus. (Or that he concludes it with a chapter titled 
“Nature, Reason, God.”)8  
Rather, the dividing line between natural law and classical positivism 
is metaphysical. For classical positivists, natural lawyers erroneously ac-
 
5 Dan Priel, Towards Classical Positivism, 101 Va. L. Rev. 987 (2015). 
6 Or, more accurately, natural law as imaginatively diminished by positivist interlocutors. 
See id. at 988–89.  
7 Brian Bix, On the Dividing Line Between Natural Law Theory and Positivism, 75 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1613 (2000). 
8 See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, chs. 3–8, 13 (2d ed. 2011). 
POJANOWSKI_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 5/13/2015 4:55 PM 
2015] Commentary 1025 
cept a nonmaterialist understanding of nature in general and human na-
ture in particular. Once we start with the right philosophical building 
blocks and study man and the state as an empirical science, we can bet-
ter understand law’s relation to morality and political theory. More im-
portantly, we can reform law and its practice in light of the human sci-
ences. This last aspect traces another dividing line—the one between 
classical and modern positivism. Most contemporary positivists seek to 
understand the concepts and the internal view of legal practitioners, ra-
ther than situating and reforming law from the external stance of social 
science and normative philosophy. 
As noted, I applaud Priel’s bid to widen the gauge of jurisprudential 
inquiry.9 That said, the article raises questions, some of which suggest 
friendly amendments, others of which challenge its thesis. First, and 
perhaps most technically, Priel could explain a bit more how contempo-
rary positivism is not materialist in its conception of nature. This may be 
true, but it is not as well developed in the article as the metaphysical di-
vide. Another interesting question, perhaps beyond the scope of the arti-
cle, concerns whether contemporary positivism’s metaphysical parsimo-
ny is mere methodological bracketing or rather a reflection of skepticism 
about any richer metaphysics generally.10 If denial of metaphysics is 
suggestive of an implicitly materialist metaphysics, perhaps some con-
temporary positivists should follow their deepest held premises toward 
the classical form Priel advocates. 
A more direct challenge goes to whether Priel’s account of classical 
positivism and natural law, along with his criticism of contemporary 
positivism, relies too much on an external standpoint. As an interpretive 
matter, Priel seems correct regarding classical positivism. Bentham and 
Hobbes, for better or worse, were committed externalists, and Priel is 
correct to not only underline Bentham’s well-known critique of the 
common law but also to flag Hobbes’s underappreciated A Dialogue Be-
tween a Philosopher and a Student, of the Common Laws of England.11 
There is also some truth to his claim that natural lawyers subscribe to the 
 
9 See generally Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Legal Thought in Enlightenment’s Wake, 4 Juris-
prudence 158, 162 (2013) (questioning whether contemporary jurisprudence can or should 
avoid broader questions of morality and even metaphysics). 
10 See id. at 170–71 (suggesting this possibility). 
11 Thomas Hobbes, A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student, of the Common 
Laws of England (1681), reprinted in Writings on Common Law and Hereditary Right 1 
(Alan Cromartie ed., 2005). 
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external perspective in jurisprudence. Some natural lawyers can at times 
seem pointedly unconcerned with the understanding of legal practition-
ers and officials. Yet, while situating or even grounding law in matters 
of metaphysics and political and moral philosophy has its benefits, I 
wonder if such purely external approaches commit the inverse of the er-
ror Priel ascribes to contemporary positivists.12 
Put another way, a general jurisprudence that jettisons either the in-
ternal perspective or external considerations seems incomplete. Some 
natural lawyers, for example, see deep value in the legal practitioner’s 
tendency on a workaday basis to treat legal materials, reasoning, and va-
lidity as relatively isolated from general moral considerations.13 This 
specialized, artificial body of practical reason, while ultimately justified 
on nonlegal requirements like the moral necessity of cooperation and 
coordination for human flourishing, cannot function if the practitioners 
primarily view the enterprise in external terms. To be sure, the practi-
tioners must also understand that law’s peculiar form of reasoning and 
its frequent focus on legal validity is only valuable in light of those 
higher purposes, a consideration that leads many natural lawyers to be 
more likely than contemporary positivists to treat law as presumptively 
binding as a matter of morality. The sense here, however, is that for law 
to serve its ultimate purposes—and for the institution to be under-
stood—the creative tension between internal practice and external goals 
must be managed, rather than theorized away. 
Priel is correct to identify the error of treating the internal perspective 
as exclusively defining the province of jurisprudence, but a general ju-
risprudence that treats beliefs of legal officials and legally conscious cit-
izens as secondary to the enterprise, or worse, strikes me as problematic. 
Nor does this objection depend on a commitment to an antipositivist out-
look, either. Even Oliver Wendell Holmes, externalist par excellence in 
his academic writings, in practice usually tended the path of law with the 
careful shears of the jurist, not the bulldozer of a scientific planner. A 
materialist account in which the attitudes of practitioners are understood 
 
12 For an illuminating analysis and critique of contemporary jurisprudence’s use of the “in-
ternal point of view,” see Charles L. Barzun, Inside-Out: Beyond the Internal/External Dis-
tinction in Legal Scholarship, 101 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015). 
13 See generally Köpcke Tinturé, supra note 2, at 83–84 (explaining how lawyers can make 
law by disregarding morality and other considerations as long as it does not jeopardize the 
validity of the system, while arguing that even though lawyers can do this, it does not mean 
they do well as a moral matter). 
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as vital to the enterprise, even if not entirely constitutive of it, seems 
highly plausible. In that light, Bentham’s sneering survey of the com-
mon law might resemble the attitude of the naïve anthropologist who 
concludes the “natives” under observation are irrational before grasping 
the texture of the culture and the relationship between social practices 
and higher commitments. 
That said, I find it less likely that natural lawyers would be disposed 
to undertake a root-and-branch critique and reconfiguration of a legal 
system in Benthamite fashion. Nor do I see a Hobbesian writing a sym-
pathetic, reconstructive analysis of Blackstone or the declaratory theory 
of law in the way, say, John Finnis or Albert Alschuler have.14 Perhaps 
this difference is contingent: A Hobbesian’s or Benthamite’s external 
point of view might ultimately lead the theorist to the way we run and 
talk about our legal system. But there is a strong vein of skepticism—
cynical acid—in classical positivism about the value and determinacy of 
legal discourse’s strange and subtle ways and vocabulary.15 Accordingly, 
it is worth wondering whether this difference does, as Priel says, go back 
to metaphysics. Along Priel’s dividing line, the natural lawyer is com-
mitted to the existence and reconciliation of two spheres of being—
material and nonmaterial—whereas the classical positivist aspires to 
avoid multiplying entities beyond necessity. It is not surprising, then, 
that early legal realists saw theology and fictitious entities behind every 
corner of conventional legal discussion and practice,16 or that, tradition-
ally, being an earthly lawyer came “naturally” to clergy and Talmudic 
scholars. If there is some value to the internal point of view in jurispru-
dence, then, perhaps the natural law tradition, not conceptual positivism, 
is its most natural home. 
 
14 See 4 John Finnis, Blackstone’s Theoretical Intentions 189–210 (1967), reprinted in 
Philosophy of Law: Collected Essays 189 (2011); Albert Alschuler, From Blackstone to 
Holmes: The Revolt Against Natural Law, 36 Pepp. L. Rev. 491, 492–93 (2009); John 
Finnis, The Fairy Tale’s Moral, 115 Law Q. Rev. 170, 170 (1999). 
15 Cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 462 (1897) 
(explaining how a vague legal concept “shrinks and at the same time grows more precise 
when we wash it with cynical acid”). 
16 See, e.g., Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Col-
um. L. Rev. 809, 809–11 (1935) (deriding the “heaven of legal concepts”). 

